Getting to Know your Agent: Interim Information in Long Term Contractual Relationships by Roland Strausz
Getting to Know your Agent: Interim Information in
Long Term Contractual Relationships
Roland Strausz¤
Free University of Berlin
November 7, 2001
Abstract
In a ﬁnitely repeated principal agent relationship with adverse selection I study
(exogenous) interim information that is revealed during a long term relationship.
Interim information mitigates adverse selection. Veriﬁability, measured by the cost
of signal manipulation, and the signal’s informativeness determine the use and
eﬀectiveness of interim information: Less precise and more manipulable signals are
used in a forward looking way exclusively. More precise and less manipulable signals
are also used in a backward looking way and extract all information rents. Highly
precise signals with a high degree of veriﬁability yield the ﬁrst best. Moreover,
veriﬁability and informativeness are substitutes.
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It is widely recognized that contracting relationships are typically formed under
asymmetric information. A bank will question the creditworthiness of a poten-
tial customer. An employer will be concerned with the productivity of his young
employee. And a marrying couple will worry about the suitability of his or her re-
spective partner. Yet, much of this asymmetric information disappears over time.
Due to repeated interaction contracting partners get to know each other better and
the interim information that is revealed during repeated interactions dilutes the
asymmetric information that exists ex ante.
This paper investigates how long term contracts use interim information opti-
mally. Intuitively, there exist two diﬀerent ways to employ the information. First,
contracting parties may use the information in a foreward looking way, improv-
ing the coordination of future actions and decisions. But taking a more strategic
perspective the partners may also want to try to use the information to inﬂuence
decisions that are taken before any interim information is received. That is, agents
may want to employ the information in a backward looking way.
Clearly the eﬀectiveness of interim information depends largely on its informa-
tiveness. Yet, also the veriﬁability of the information plays an important role. With
veriﬁable information the contracting parties can condition their contracts directly
on the interim information. Something which cannot be done when the information
is nonveriﬁable. Indeed, in real life much of the acquired knowledge due to repeated
interactions tends to be subjective and simply reﬂects a personal opinion about the
counter party such as its trustworthiness or likeability. In this case, contracts can
condition on the information only indirectly. This indicates that the veriﬁability of
the interim information plays a crucial role in determining its eﬀectiveness. Hence,
apart from the question how people use interim information, this paper also focuses
on the role of its veriﬁability.
More speciﬁcally, this paper analyzes a repeated principal agent setting in which
the agent possesses private information ex ante. The principal and agent interact
during two periods in between which the principal receives some information about
the agent. The analysis conﬁrms that the veriﬁability of the interim information
is crucial. Whenever interim information is veriﬁable, interim information resolves
the repeated adverse selection problem completely. This holds for any degree of
informativeness. Hence, under veriﬁability the principal uses interim information
in both a forward and backward looking way, adjusting ﬁrst and second period
allocations to increase eﬃciency as compared to a situation in which no interim
information is available.
On the other hand, if interim information is not veriﬁable, it cannot resolve the
problem. In fact, if the informativeness of the information is low, the principal uses
interim information only in a forward looking way and does not adjust the ineﬃ-
cient allocation in the ﬁrst period. Only if the informativeness is above a certain3
threshold, does the existence of interim information aﬀect ﬁrst period allocations.
Moreover, nonveriﬁable interim information resolves the problem of asymmetric
information only if it is perfect.
To investigate the role of veriﬁability I introduce the possibility of information
manipulation and argue that information manipulation oﬀers a natural way to
arrive at a continuous concept of veriﬁability. It enables a parametrization of
veriﬁability and helps to reconcile the dichotomous character of the veriﬁability
versus the non-veriﬁability model. More speciﬁcally, it shows how the use of interim
information diﬀers according to the veriﬁability of the information. First, a highly
veriﬁable signal enables the principal to achieve the ﬁrst best. Second, whenever
the veriﬁability of interim information is low, the principal uses it to reduce the
informational rent of the agent. In this case, the interim information does not aﬀect
the ﬁrst period allocations and the principal uses the information only in a forward
looking way. Third, for intermediate ranges of veriﬁability the principal extracts all
informational rents and uses the interim information to reduce the distortion on the
allocation of both ﬁrst and second period allocations. The relative sizes of the three
regions depend on the precision of the interim signal: For more precise signals the
range of parameters signifying a high veriﬁability is larger. With a perfect signal,
any degree of veriﬁability enables the implementation of the ﬁrst best.
Related to the current paper is Cooper and Hayes (1987) who analyze a repeated
insurance model with adverse selection in which accidents provide interim informa-
tion about the agent’s true type. However, the authors do not address the issue of
veriﬁability. Their setup also does not oﬀer a straightforward way to analyze the
role of the informativeness of interim information, because the informativeness is
directly linked to the agent’s type. Yet, the paper oﬀers another example of the
use of interim information in long term relationships and notes its common use in
insurance contracts.
Finally, it is important to note that the existing literature on contracting has
studied a diﬀerent form of interim information. Baron and Besanko (1984) analyze
a multi period adverse selection setting in which interim information revelation may
occur due to the agent’s behavior. Speciﬁcally, if the principal oﬀers a revelation
mechanism in the ﬁrst period, the agent’s message may reveal his type and embody
interim information. The important diﬀerence to our framework of interim infor-
mation is that in Baron and Besanko (1984) the revelation of interim information
lies under the full control of the agent and is endogenous. Baron and Besanko show
that endogenous interim information does not beneﬁt the principal.1 Indeed, when-
ever the principal has full commitment, her optimal policy is to commit not to use
interim information. Hence, the current paper diﬀers from the ratcheting literature
1In fact, this is a direct result of the classical revelation principle. Any information that is revealed
by the agent’s behavior could also be revealed in the ﬁrst period.4
as for example Laﬀont and Tirole (1988, 1990) in which, due to the principal’s lim-
ited commitment, the interim information actually hurts the principal and repeated
interaction should be avoided (e.g. Ickes and Samuelson 1987). Contrasting the
current paper to this literature reveals that there exists a crucial diﬀerence between
endogenous and exogenous information in a repeated adverse selection model.
2 The Model
Consider a principal employing an agent who is privately informed about his marginal
cost. With probability ® the agent’s constant marginal cost is µl, with probability
1 ¡ ® his constant marginal cost is µh, where µh > µl. The agent’s action a results
into a veriﬁable output v(a).
The principal employs the agent for two periods. In between the two periods the
principal receives an exogenous signal s 2 fh;lg about the agent’s marginal cost.
The signal is correct with probability p > 1=2. The common discount rate between
the two periods is ±. As owner of the ﬁrm the principal receives the agent’s output
and compensates the agent by paying a wage w. Hence, if the principal pays wages
(w1;w2) over the two periods and the agent chooses actions (a1;a2) the principal’s
and agent’s payoﬀs are
V (w1;a1;w2;a2) = v(a1) ¡ w1 + ±(v(a2) ¡ w2);
Ui(w1;a1;w2;a2) = w1 ¡ µia1 + ±(w2 ¡ µia2);
respectively, where i 2 fh;lg. We assume that v is increasing and concave, i.e.,
v0 > 0 and v00 < 0, and, for technical reasons, that v000 < 0.
Since output is veriﬁable and invertible, an enforceable contract ° speciﬁes
an action a, and a transfer, the wage w, for each period, i.e. ° = (°1;°2) =
(w1;a1;w2;a2). As is standard, the contract may depend on a message m of
the agent about his type. If the signal is veriﬁable, the contract conditions,
in addition, directly on the signal s. In this case, the contract has the form
°ms = (°1(m);°2(m;s)). When s is nonveriﬁable, the contract can depend only
indirectly on the signal, in the sense that the principal may report it by sending
some message r. That is, a general contract has the form °mr = (°1(m);°2(m;r)).
3 Two Benchmarks
In this section I analyze two benchmarks to which I will later relate the existence
of interim information.
First consider a setting with full information in which the agent’s type is observ-
able. In this case the principal can prescribe each type of agent to work eﬃciently5
and appropriate the entire surplus. Eﬃcient eﬀort levels, a
fb
i , are deﬁned by2
v0(a
fb
i ) = µi;
with i 2 fh;lg. Hence, with full information the optimal contract ° is a ﬁrst best
contract that implements in each period the respective ﬁrst best action levels a
fb
i




i . Note that the prescribed actions levels are time-
invariant and that the optimal transfers are partially undetermined, because, due to
the common discount factor ±, the principal and agent can freely allocate transfers
over the periods without aﬀecting utilities. To circumvent this indeterminacy I
assume, without loss of generality, that all transfers in the ﬁrst period are zero.
That is, the ﬁrst best contract speciﬁes a ﬁrst period transfer w1i = 0 and a second





Now suppose the agent’s type is private information and the signal s is not
available, then, as shown by Baron and Besanko (1984), the optimal long term con-
tract is time-invariant.3 It is a twice repeated version of the optimal contract in the
static, single period model. That is, a standard principal–agent model with adverse
selection in which the principal faces the familiar trade–oﬀ between eﬃciency and
rent appropriation. By the classical revelation principle the optimal contract is a
direct mechanism and the solution to the following maximization problem:4
P0: max V = ®(v(al) ¡ wl) + (1 ¡ ®)(v(ah) ¡ wh)
s.t. wl ¡ µlal ¸ 0 (1)
wh ¡ µhah ¸ 0 (2)
wl ¡ µlal ¸ wh ¡ µlah (3)
wh ¡ µhah ¸ wl ¡ µhal; (4)
where (1) and (2) are the participation constraints and (3) and (4) are the incentive
constraints that ensure truthful revelation. Let V sb represent the solution to P0.
By standard arguments only the incentive constraint of the eﬃcient type µl and
the participation constraint of the ineﬃcient type µh are binding. The solution to
this problem is a second best contract that implements the second best action levels
(asb
l ;asb
h ). As is standard, the eﬃcient type receives a strict positive information
rent Usb
l > 0, while his action is eﬃcient (asb
l = a
fb
l ). The ineﬃcient type does
not receive a rent Usb






h ) = µh +
®
1 ¡ ®
(µh ¡ µl) > µh: (5)
2Throughout the paper we assume that the solution of the problem is interior. Suﬃcient conditions
are v(0) = ¡1 and v0(1) = 0.
3See also Laﬀont and Tirole (1993, p. 104).
4To have a non-trivial problem, I assume throughout this paper that the principal wants to employ
both agents, which is the case if ® is small enough.6
4 Veriﬁable Information
Now consider the signal s and suppose that it is veriﬁable such that a general
contract has the form °ms = (°1(m);°2(m;s)). In this case, the principal can, for
any p > 1=2, attain the ﬁrst best. That is, induce either type to work eﬃciently
for both periods and appropriate the entire surplus from production.
Let wis represent the agent’s payment in period 2 if he claims to be type µi and
a signal s is received. As shown in the second benchmark, without the signal s the
principal’s problem is to pick a menu that does not give the eﬃcient type µl an
incentive to claim he is ineﬃcient. With the signal s this problem can be solved
costlessly. Indeed, by choosing whh > whl the principal is able to make the contract
that is meant for type µh relatively less attractive to type µl, since the eﬃcient type
µl would receive the higher wage whh only with probability 1 ¡ p < 1=2, whereas
type µl receives it with probability p > 1=2. Therefore, the expected payment
associated with the payments (whh;whl) is less for type µl than for type µh and
the contract °h = (°1(h;s);°2(h;s)) which is meant for the type µh becomes less
attractive to type µl. In fact, by prescribing each type his eﬃcient eﬀort level, i.e.
ah = ahh = ahl = a
fb
h and al = alh = all = a
fb
l , and choosing whh and whl such that
±(pwhl + (1 ¡ p)whh) + (1 + ±)µla
fb
h · 0;
type µl has no incentive to misreport his type.5
Proposition 1 Suppose the signal s is veriﬁable, then for any p > 1=2 the principal
can implement the ﬁrst best actions at ﬁrst best costs through a direct mechanism












h ((1 ¡ p)µh ¡ pµl)
±(2p ¡ 1)
:
With a veriﬁable signal the principal is able to attain the ﬁrst best, by con-
ditioning her wages on the signal s and choosing whh > whl. The intuition is
straightforward: The principal rewards the agent if the signal s conﬁrms the agent’s
message that he is type µh and punishes him otherwise. Because the agent is risk
neutral with respect to money only his expected payment interests him and the
reward-punishment as expressed by the diﬀerence
∆wh ´ whh ¡ whl = ∆ ¯ wh ´





is suﬃcient for the principal to attain the ﬁrst best.
5All formal proofs are relegated to the appendix.7
The positive wedge between whh and whl of at least ∆ ¯ wh is a necessary condi-
tion for contracts that attains the ﬁrst best. Indeed, by the revelation principle a
solution to the principal’s problem is a direct mechanism ° = (°rs) with r 2 fh;lg
that ensures truthful revelation of the agent’s type. The principal utility from such
a direct mechanism is
V ´ ®(pV (°ll) + (1 ¡ p)V (°lh)) + (1 ¡ ®)(pV (°hh) + (1 ¡ p)V (°hl)): (7)
According to the revelation principle the direct mechanism (°mr) has to induce the
agent to reveal his type truthfully. I.e., the following two incentive compatibility
conditions have to hold
pUl(°ll) + (1 ¡ p)Ul(°lh) ¸ pUl(°hl) + (1 ¡ p)Ul(°hh); (8)
pUh(°hh) + (1 ¡ p)Uh(°hl) ¸ pUh(°lh) + (1 ¡ p)Uh(°ll); (9)
where condition (8) ensures that the agent of type l reveals himself truthfully and
(9) induces type µh to report himself truthfully.
Finally, the contract must ensure acceptance of both types of agents, i.e.,
pUl(°ll) + (1 ¡ p)Ul(°lh) ¸ 0; (10)
pUh(°hh) + (1 ¡ p)Uh(°hl) ¸ 0: (11)
Hence, a solution to the following maximization problem solves the principal’s
problem:
P1: max V
s.t. (8), (9), (10), and (11).
The following proposition shows that the wedge is a direct implication of the
incentive compatibility constraint (8).
Proposition 2 The principal can attain the ﬁrst best only with a wedge ∆wh of
at least ∆ ¯ wh
Note that the necessary punishment-reward structure ∆wh increases as the sig-
nal becomes less informative. In fact, when p approaches 1/2 the wedge ∆wh goes
to inﬁnity.
A direct comparison with the second best solution obtained in the second bench-
mark shows that the signal aﬀects both the ﬁrst and second period action levels
of the ineﬃcient type µh. This implies that the principal uses the signal s in a
forward and backward looking way. Hence, even though the signal is received after
the ﬁrst period, the signal inﬂuences the ﬁrst period contract. In fact, the princi-
pal is able to use the interim information to implement the ﬁrst best action level8
also in the ﬁrst period. This result is not new. From the perspective of the ﬁrst
period the interim information may be seen as ex post information. As Riordan
and Sappington (1988) show veriﬁable ex post information is suﬃcient to eliminate
ineﬃciencies due to ex ante asymmetric information. As becomes clear in the next
section this result depends crucially on the veriﬁability of the signal.
5 Nonveriﬁable Information
If the signal s is privately observed by the principal, a veriﬁable contract ° can-
not depend directly on the signal s. Instead, the second period contract may
only depend on the principal’s announcement r about her signal s. Invoking
the revelation principle the optimal contract is a direct mechanism of the form
°mr = (°1(m);°2(m;r)) which ensures truthful revelation of the private informa-
tion of the agent and principal.6 The second period contract, °2(m;r) = (amr;wmr),
must therefore be structured in such a way that the principal has an incentive to
reveal her signal truthfully. Given that the agent sent a message m, the principal
announces the signal s = h truthfully if
v(amh) ¡ wmh ¸ v(aml) ¡ wml:
On the other hand, a truthful revelation of a signal s = l requires
v(aml) ¡ wml ¸ v(amh) ¡ wmh:
Since both inequalities have to hold at the same time, they must be satisﬁed in
equality. Hence, for each m 2 fh;lg it must hold that
v(aml) ¡ wml = v(amh) ¡ wmh: (12)
Equality (12) has an important implication and reﬂects the limitations due to a
nonveriﬁability of the signal s. It shows that the contract °mr must be structured
such that after the agent has sent his message m, the realization of the signal does
not aﬀect the principal’s payoﬀs. Indeed, substitution of (12) into (7) yields
V = ®(v(al) ¡ wl) + ±(v(all ¡ wll)) + (1 ¡ ®)(v(ah) ¡ wh) + ±(v(ahh ¡ whh)) (13)
and shows that the principal’s objective function is independent of probability
p, i.e., independent of the signal’s realization. Hence, nonveriﬁability limits the
eﬀectiveness of the signal s drastically. In fact, when the signal s is nonveriﬁable, the
principal is unable to gain directly from it. Yet, the remainder of this section shows
6Note that because the principal cannot commit to some reporting strategy ex ante, she has imperfect
commitment and the classical revelation principle may fail to hold (See Bester and Strausz 2001 for more
details). Yet, because the principal’s announcement decision is independent of her belief concerning the
agent’s type, the standard proof and therefore the classical revelation principle itself nevertheless holds.9
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Figure 1: Utilities with nonveriﬁability
that, due to an indirect incentive eﬀect on the agent, the principal nevertheless gains
from the signal s.
By the revelation principle the agent has to reveal his information, given that
the principal reveals her information truthfully. This is expressed by the earlier
conditions (8) and (9). In addition, both types of agents should accept the contract.
A requirement that is expressed by (10) and (11).
Summarizing, the principal must solve the following maximization problem
P2: max V
s.t. (8), (9), (10), (11), (12).
Observe that the only diﬀerence between the principal’s maximization problem
P1 and the new problem P2 is the principal’s incentive constraint (12). It signiﬁes
that with nonveriﬁability the principal’s use of the interim information is more
restricted. Indeed, the solution of Proposition 1 violates the constraint and, due
to the new constraint, the ﬁrst best is no longer attainable for p < 1. For any
p 2 [1=2;1) the ﬁrst best implies ahh = ahl = a
fb
h . Hence, to satisfy (12) it must
hold whl = whh. But according to Proposition 2 the ﬁrst best requires whl > whh.
Proposition 3 There exists a ˆ p < 1=(1 + ®) such that for all p < ˆ p the optimal
contract leaves the eﬃcient agent a positive rent and prescribes an action level for
the ﬁrst period that is identical to a situation in which no signal is available. For
p > ˆ p the optimal contract extracts all rents and the ﬁrst period action level is more
eﬃcient than in a situation without the signal s. Moreover, for p = 1=2 the solution
coincides with the second best. For p = 1 the solution coincides with the ﬁrst best.
Proposition 3 shows that, depending on the informativeness of the signal s,
the optimal contract is of two types. If the signal’s informativeness is low, p < ˆ p,
the principal uses signal s to reduce the informational rent of the eﬃcient type
exclusively. That is, she does not use the signal to improve the allocative eﬃciency
of the ﬁrst period contract. In contrast, for more informative signals, p > ˆ p, the10
principal extracts all rents and also adjusts the action level of the ﬁrst period closer
to the ﬁrst best. Moreover, the ﬁrst best is only attainable with a perfect signal,
i.e., with p = 1.
Figure 1 illustrates how utility of the principal and the eﬃcient type µl depends
on the informativeness of the signal s. For p = 1=2 the signal is uninformative and
the principal’s utility coincides with the second best. As p increases the signal s
becomes more informative and may be used to relax the agent’s incentive constraint.
In the range of 1/2 to ˆ p the principal’s uses the signal to reduce the informational
rent to the agent. At p = ˆ p the informational rent is completely depleted and the
individual rationality constraint of the eﬃcient agent becomes binding. From ˆ p
onwards, the principal reduces the allocative distortion. At p = 1 all distortions
disappear and the principal achieves the ﬁrst best.
6 Manipulative Signals
The previous two sections show that the use and eﬀectiveness of interim information
depends on its veriﬁability. With veriﬁability the principal achieves the ﬁrst best
for any informative signal, whereas with an nonveriﬁable signal the principal can
only attain the ﬁrst best if the signal is perfect. Veriﬁability is key and it is
therefore worthwhile to have a closer look at the role it plays. In addition, also
the discontinuity at p = 1=2 in the case of a veriﬁable signal seems puzzling: For
any p > 1=2 the principal attains the ﬁrst best, but for p = 1=2 only a second best
obtains.
To address these issues more carefully it is helpful to generalize the binary view
of veriﬁability and to arrive at a more continuous concept. Starting point of the
generalization is the observation that the two cases illustrate two extremes: When a
signal is veriﬁable, the principal is unable to inﬂuence it. Whereas, when the signal
is private information, the contract depends only on a voluntary announcement of
the signal, which eﬀectively implies that the principal can freely determine its real-
ization. It is therefore natural to view veriﬁability in terms of signal manipulation.
To model the idea of manipulation I assume that the principal can, at some
commonly known cost K, change the signal h into a signal l.7 That is, after receiv-
ing a signal s = h the principal can invest K and change the signal’s realization
into s = l. Note that this model with manipulation comprises the previous two
models. If the signal is veriﬁable, the cost K is inﬁnitely large. If the signal is
non-veriﬁable, the manipulation cost K is zero.
The view of veriﬁability as a degree of manipulation clariﬁes the discontinuity
at p = 1=2 and, in addition, provides a further argument in favor of signal manip-
7For simplicity I assume that the principal can only change a signal h into a signal l. This is the
relevant direction of manipulation.11
ulation. Proposition 2 shows that when p approaches 1=2 the principal can only
attain the ﬁrst best if she prescribes inﬁnite penalties and rewards. This implies
that the stakes between the principal and agent become extremely high. Given
that the agent claims he is of type µh, the principal has an extreme incentive to
prevent a signal s = h from occurring. Hence, the implementability of the ﬁrst
best in Section 4 depends crucially on the assumption that the principal does not
have a possibility to inﬂuence the outcome of the signal s. But with inﬁnitely high
stakes, it seems extremely unrealistic that contracting parties will not ﬁnd ways
of manipulation. In contrast, with any some possibility of signal manipulation,
captured by a ﬁnite K, the result of Proposition 1 breaks down for p close to 1/2.
The remainder of this section derives the optimal contract under signal manip-
ulation and compares the results to the extremes of the previous two sections.
Given an announcement h of the agent the principal’s decision whether to ma-
nipulate the signal is straightforward. If s = h and the principal does not manip-
ulate the signal she receives v(ahh) ¡ whh. When manipulating into a signal s = l
she gets v(ahl)¡whl ¡K. Hence, a principal has no strict incentive to manipulate
the signal s if
K ¸ whh ¡ v(ahh) ¡ whl + v(ahl): (14)
Lemma 1 Without loss of generality an optimal contract exhibits whh ¡ v(ahh) ¡
whl + v(ahl) · K.
The lemma shows that the principal may restrict attention to contracts which
convince the agent that a signal will not be manipulated. An intuitive result: A
signal that is bound to be manipulated is simply worthless. Given the lemma,
a solution to the principal’s problem is a solution to the following optimization
problem:
P3: max V
s.t. (8), (9), (10), (11), (14).
Hence, the manipulation-proofness constraint (14) replaces the principal’s incentive
constraint (12) in problem P2. Indeed, for K = 0 the condition (14) reduces to
(12). For K = 1 the constraint becomes inconsequential and the maximization
problem is identical to P1. In the following, let V (p;K) represent the solution to
P3 as a function of the signal’s accuracy, p and its veriﬁability, K.
Whether the manipulation-proofness constraint is binding at the optimum will
depend on the parameters K and p. In the following deﬁne
¯ p(K) ´ min
(
1=2 +
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Figure 2: Optimal forward (FL) and backward (BL) looking use.
Lemma 2 If p < ¯ p(K) the constraint whh ¡v(ahh)¡whl +v(ahl) · K is binding.
The Lemma shows that if the signal’s informativeness is low relative to the cost
of manipulation K, the requirement that the contract must convince the agent that
the principal does not manipulate the signal becomes a binding constraint. The
lemma leads to to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The ﬁrst best is attainable if and only if p ¸ ¯ p(K).
Hence, ¯ p(K) represents a cut-oﬀ value above which the principal is able to attain
the ﬁrst best. The higher the cost of manipulation K, the lower the cut-oﬀ value
¯ p(K). Indeed, as K goes to inﬁnity, ¯ p(K) approaches 1=2 and the principal can
attain the ﬁrst best for any p ¸ 1=2, conﬁrming the result of Proposition 1. A
parameter value K = 0 captures the other extreme of non-veriﬁable information
and yields ¯ p(K) = 1. It implies that, in line with Proposition 5, the ﬁrst best is
only attainable with a perfect signal.
Proposition 4 There exists a ˆ p(K) 2 [1=2; ˆ p] such that for all p < ˆ p(K) the
optimal contract leaves the eﬃcient agent with a rent. For p 2 [ˆ p(K); ¯ p(K)) the
optimal contract extracts all rents. For p ¸ ¯ p(K) the principal implements ﬁrst best
action levels at ﬁrst best costs. The functions ˆ p(K) and ¯ p(K) are both decreasing
in K. It holds that ˆ p(0) = ˆ p and limK!1ˆ p(K) = 1=2.
As Figure 2 illustrates, Proposition 4 shows that interim information can be
classiﬁed according to the degree of informativeness. If the interim information
contains little information, i.e. p < ˆ p(K), the principal uses it to reduce the rent
of the eﬃcient agent, but does not aﬀect the ﬁrst period action levels. Hence,
small degrees of interim information are used in a forward looking way only. For an
intermediate degree of information, the principal extracts all rents and, in addition,
reduces the distortion on the action level in the ﬁrst period. That is, she uses interim
information also in a backward looking way. Finally, the principal may use interim
information with a high informative content, i.e. p ¸ ¯ p(K), to solve her adverse
problem completely and thereby achieve the ﬁrst best.13
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Figure 3: Principal’s utility with manipulation.
Figure 3a and 3b illustrate the eﬀect of p and K on the principal’s utility. The
ﬁrst ﬁgure contrasts the two extremes K = 0 and K = 1 to an intermediate value
K. In the range from 1=2 to ˆ p(K) the principal’s utility is increasing, because a
higher p enables the principal to reduce the informational rent to the eﬃcient agent
µl. At ˆ p(K) the principal extracts all rents. A further increase in p, nevertheless,
raises the principal’s utility, because she now adjusts the implemented actions closer
to the ﬁrst best. As of ¯ p(K) the principal is able to implement ﬁrst best action
levels at ﬁrst best costs. The cut-oﬀ values ˆ p(K) and ¯ p(K) are decreasing in K,
such that, given a less manipulative signal, the principal may achieve the ﬁrst best
for a less accurate signal.
Figure 3b emphasizes the role of veriﬁability. Given a ﬁxed level of accuracy
p it draws the principal’s utility as a function of the veriﬁability parameter K.
Again one may identify three regions. Whenever the signal’s veriﬁability is low,
K < ˆ K, the principal uses interim information for rent extraction only. If the
level of veriﬁability is high, K > ¯ K the interim information allows the principal
to achieve the ﬁrst best. For intermediate levels of veriﬁability, K 2 ( ˆ K; ¯ K),
the principal uses the interim information to extract all rents and to reduce the
allocative distortion. Note that in line with Proposition 5 the principal beneﬁts
from interim information, even when the signal is nonveriﬁable, i.e., V (p;0) > V sb
for any p > 1=2.
Proposition 4 and the two ﬁgures show that the signal’s precision p and its
degree of veriﬁability K are substitutes: Without aﬀecting her utility the principal
may substitute a signal with a high degree of informativeness and an intermediate
level of veriﬁability for a signal with an intermediate degree of informativeness and
a high level of veriﬁability. This observation points to a potential trade-oﬀ between
a signal’s precision and its degree of veriﬁability. More speciﬁcally, suppose that
the principal may choose from multiple signaling technologies which diﬀer accord-
ing to their informativeness p and manipulability K. Formally, let T represent the
set of available signaling technologies (p;K). Then we may obtain from the set T
a subset of eﬃcient technologies Te that contain those pairs (p;K) 2 T such that14
there does not exist a K0 > K with (p;K0) 2 T. Whenever Te is not a singleton,
the principal faces a trade-oﬀ, as there exist multiple eﬃcient technologies. Some
produce more informative signals than others, but are, as a drawback, easier to ma-
nipulate. Ultimately, it depends on the function V (p;K) which auditing technology
(p¤;K¤) 2 Te is optimal. That is, (p¤;K¤) = argmax(p;K)2Te V (p;K). Clearly, the
optimal auditing technology may not be the most informative one.
The trade-oﬀ is reinforced if one extends the model further by modeling in-
terim information as a costly auditing technology of the principal. Let c(p;K)
represent the cost of an interim signal with precision p and veriﬁability K. The
principal’s optimal auditing technology may then be calculated as (p¤;K¤) =
argmaxV (p;K) ¡ c(p;K). When, as seems reasonable, the cost c(p;K) is increas-
ing in p and K, the aforementioned trade-oﬀ between precision and veriﬁability is
strengthened.
7 Conclusion and Extensions
This paper studied the use of interim information, since the presence of such infor-
mation seems a natural characteristic of repeated interactions. In fact, it may be the
very reason why economic agents enter into a contractual relationship rather than
transact on an anonymous spot market in which such information is not produced.8
Interim information mitigates the adverse selection problem and, depending on its
informativeness and veriﬁability, may resolve the problem completely. Hence, in
repeated contractual relationships that start under asymmetric information the
adverse selection problem may be less problematic than the standard static model
suggests.
Speciﬁcally, the paper showed that less precise and more manipulable signals are
used in a forward looking way only to arrive at less distorted future actions and a
reduction in the agent’s information rent. More precise and less manipulable signals
are in addition used in a backward looking way to reduce the allocative distortion
in the previous period and an extraction of all information rents. Finally, highly
precise signals with a high degree of veriﬁability are able to yield the ﬁrst best.
The paper showed, moreover, that veriﬁability is a crucial determinant of the
eﬀectiveness of interim information. More speciﬁcally, a signal’s veriﬁability and
its informativeness are substitute. This points to a new potential trade-oﬀ in the
choice of auditing procedures that the literature has hitherto disregarded: a signal’s
precision versus its degree of veriﬁability. In particular, contracting parties may
be well advised to choose a less accurate auditing technology that is less prone to
manipulation at the expense of a highly accurate one which is more manipulable.
The paper’s model suggests multiple extensions. First, the contractual relation-
8The value of the interim information is the diﬀerence V (p;K) ¡ V sb.15
ship may extend to more than two periods and, hence, multiple interim signals.
As long as the number of periods are ﬁnite, however, similar results obtain.9 The
type of equilibrium that results then depends on the overall informativeness of all
signals taken together. Second, the agent’s type may directly aﬀect the principal’s
utility such that the contracting environment exhibits a common value component.
A complication of a common value environment is that the classical revelation prin-
ciple does not hold anymore. Bester and Strausz (2001) show how this complicates
a proper analysis. Nevertheless, also in a common value environment the interim
signal does not make the principal worse oﬀ, since she can always write her contract
independent of the signal and thereby mimic the outcome without the interim in-
formation. A common value environment may, however, reduce the value of interim
information. Third, one may introduce risk averseness on part of the agent. This
makes interim information less beneﬁcial, because, as may be shown in the analysis,
it tends to increase the amount of risk on the agent. Yet, even with risk averseness
interim information is useful and one may expect a similar role for veriﬁability.10
9With inﬁnite periods, contracting partners may use of trigger strategies to obtain folk theorem like
outcomes.
10See also Cooper and Hayes (1987).16
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
It is easy to verify that a contract with ah = ahh = ahl = a
fb
h , al = alh = all =
a
fb








±(2p¡1) , wh = wl =
0, wll = wlh = (1 + ±)µla
fb
l gives each type of agent an incentive to report his
type truthfully. Moreover, each type receives his reservation utility such that the
contract implements the ﬁrst best. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
In the ﬁrst best it holds, by deﬁnition, that ah = ahh = ahl = a
fb
h , al =
all = alh = a
fb
l and that constraints (10) and (11) bind. Incentive compatibility
constraint (8) may therefore be rewritten as
±[pwhl + (1 ¡ p)whh] · (1 + ±)µla
fb
h :
Moreover, a binding (11) implies ±[pwhh + (1 ¡ p)whl] = (1 + ±)µha
fb
h . Subtracting
this equation from the previous inequality and a rearrangement of terms yields
(1 ¡ 2p)(whh ¡ whl) ¸ (1 + ±)(µh ¡ µl)a
fb
h
and the proposition follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Assume that at the optimum only the individual rationality constraint of the inef-
ﬁcient type (2) , the incentive compatibility constraints of the principal (12), and
the incentive compatibility of the eﬃcient type are binding (3). Hence,
whh = ahlµh + ahµh=± + (ahh ¡ ahl)pµh + (1 ¡ p)(v(ahh) ¡ v(ahl))
whl = ahlµh + ahµh=± + (ahh ¡ ahl)pµh ¡ p(v(ahh) ¡ v(ahl))
wll =
ahlµh + (alh ¡ ahh)µl ¡ wlh + (1 ¡ 2p)(v(ahh ¡ v(ahl))
p
+
ahµh + (al ¡ ah)µl
±p
+ (ahh ¡ ahl)(µh + µl) + (all ¡ alh)µl + wlh
Substitution and a rearrangement of terms yields
V (p) ´ ®(v(al) ¡ alµl) + ®±(1 ¡ p)(v(alh) ¡ alhµl) + ®±p(v(all) ¡ allµl)
+(1 ¡ ®)v(ah) ¡ (µh ¡ ®µl)ah
+±((1 ¡ p ¡ ®p)v(ahl) ¡ ahl((1 ¡ p)µh ¡ ®pµl))
+±((p ¡ ®(1 ¡ p))v(ahh) ¡ (pµh ¡ ®(1 ¡ p)µl)ahh):
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to al: is v0(al:) = µl and implies the ﬁrst
best action level a
fb
l . The remaining ﬁrst order conditions are
(1 ¡ ®)[v0(ah) ¡ µh] = ®(µh ¡ µl) (15)
(1 ¡ p ¡ ®p)[v0(ahl) ¡ µh] = ®p(µh ¡ µl) (16)
(p ¡ ®(1 ¡ p))[v0(ahh) ¡ µh] = ®(1 ¡ p)(µh ¡ µl): (17)17
Equation (15) shows that the optimal value for ah coincides with the second
best, i.e. ah = asb
h , and is independent of p.
Since v00 < 0, the second order condition is also satisﬁed and (17) deﬁnes a¤
hh(p)
implicitly. For p = 1=2 the ﬁrst order condition coincides with (5) and it follows
ahh = asb
h . For p > 1=2 follows that ahh < a
fb





®(v0(ahh) ¡ µl) + (v0(ahh) ¡ µh)
(p ¡ ®(1 ¡ p))v00(ahh)
(18)
The numerator of the expression is positive due to v0(ahh) > µh > µl. The de-
nominator is positive, because v00(:) < 0 and ® < 1. Hence, ahh increases with
p.
The equation (16) deﬁnes the function a¤
lh(p) implicitly. Note that the second
order condition is satisﬁed for p < ˆ p. For p = 1=2 the ﬁrst order condition coincides
with (5) and it follows a¤0
hl(1=2) = a¤
hh(1=2) = asb





(v0(ahl) ¡ µh) + ®(v0(ahl) ¡ µl)
(1 ¡ p ¡ ®p)v00(ahl)
: (19)
The numerator is positive and, for p < ˆ p, the denominator is negative. It follows
that for p < ˆ p the optimal ahl is decreasing in p. Moreover as p approaches ˆ p the
derivative @ahl=@p goes to minus inﬁnity.
Since for p = 1=2 we have ahl = ahh = asb
h and since @ahh=@p > 0 and @ahl=@p <
0 it follows for p 2 (1=2; ˆ p) that ahl(p) < ah(p) = asb
h < ahh(p).
Now consider the individual rationality constraint (10) of agent l. Since the so-
lution for p = 1=2 coincides with the second best solution, the individual rationality





ll) + (1 ¡ p)(w¤
lh ¡ µla¤
lh)] > 0
Substitution of the relevant constraints yield
Ul(p) = (µh ¡ µl)(ah + ahh± + (ahl ¡ ahh)±p) + (2p ¡ 1)±(Sh(ahl) ¡ Sh(ahh)); (20)
where Si(a) ´ v(a) ¡ µia represents the joint surplus of the action a.








(1 ¡ ®)®(1 ¡ p)p(µh ¡ µl)2
·
1
(1 ¡ (1 + ®)p)3v00(ahl)
¡
1










and Si(a) is increasing for a < a
fb
i . The second term in the square brackets is18
non-positive since 1 ¡ (1 + ®)p · p ¡ (1 ¡ p)® and v00(ahh) · v00(ahl) < 0, due
to v000 · 0. Hence, starting from p = 1=2 the utility of type µl is decreasing in p.
As p approaches 1=(1 + ®) the ﬁrst part of the second term in the square brackets
approaches negative inﬁnity. Hence, there exists some ˆ p < 1=(1 + ®) such that
Ul(ˆ p) = 0 and the individual rationality constraint of type µl is binding for p > ˆ p.
It remains to be shown that for p = 1 the principal can achieve the ﬁrst best.
Note that if p = 1 a contract ° with al = all = a
fb
l and ah = ahh = a
fb
h , wl = wll =
µla
fb
l and wh = whh = µha
fb
h yields, if incentive compatible, the principal the ﬁrst
best outcome. To ensure incentive compatibility set whl = v(ahl) and wlh = v(alh)
such that that the constraints (12) are fulﬁlled. In order to satisfy the agent’s
incentive constraint (8) set ahl such that Sl(ahl) = v(ahl) ¡ µlahl · (µh ¡ µl)a
fb
h =±,
which is satisﬁed for ahl large enough. Finally, to respect the agent’s incentive
constraint (9) set alh such that Sh(alh) = v(alh) ¡ µhalh · (µl ¡ µh)a
fb
h =±, which is
satisﬁed for ahl large enough. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Consider a contract that exhibits whh¡v(ahh)¡whl+v(ahl) > K. This contract
induces the principal to manipulate a signal s = h into a signal s = l after an
announcement h. Hence, irrespective of the true realization of s the relevant second
period contract is (whl;ahl). Therefore, any contract with whh ¡ v(ahh) ¡ whl +
v(ahl) · K is equivalent to a contract with w0
hh = whl and a0
hh = ahl. But such a
contract satisﬁes whh ¡ v(ahh) ¡ whl + v(ahl) · K. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2:
If the constraint is not binding at the optimum, it may be disregarded in the
optimization problem. Problem P3 therefore reduces to problem P1. By Proposi-
tion 1 the solution of problem P1 is the ﬁrst best, but as shown by Proposition 2
it necessarily exhibits a wedge of at least
∆ ¯ wh =





But this violates the omitted constraint whenever p < ¯ p(K). Hence, the ﬁrst best
action ahl = a
fb
h is not implementable and since p < ¯ p(K) · 1 the ﬁrst best outcome
is not attainable. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proposition 1 establishes a contract that without the possibility of manipulation
attains the ﬁrst best. The contract does not give rise to manipulation when K ¸
[(1 + ±)(µh ¡ µl)a
fb
h ]=[±(2p ¡ 1)]. Rewriting this inequality yields p ¸ ¯ p(K) and
¯ p(K) = 1=2 as K goes to inﬁnity.
The model of Section 5 obtains for K = 0. Therefore, Proposition 3 holds for
K = 0 and it follows ˆ p(0) = ˆ p.19
Now consider p < ¯ p(K) and assume that at the optimum only constraints (8),
(11), and (14) are binding. Solving for these constraints yields
whh = ahlµh + ahµh=± + (ahh ¡ ahl)pµh + (1 ¡ p)(v(ahh) ¡ v(ahl) + K)
whl = ahlµh + ahµh=± + (ahh ¡ ahl)pµh ¡ p(v(ahh) ¡ v(ahl) + K)
wll =
ahlµh + (alh ¡ ahh)µl ¡ wlh + (1 ¡ 2p)(v(ahh ¡ v(ahl) + K)
p
+
ahµh + (al ¡ ah)µl
±p
+ (ahh ¡ ahl)(µh + µl) + (all ¡ alh)µl + wlh
Substitution yields
V (K;p) ´ ®±K(¡1 + 2p) + V (p):
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to al: is v0(al:) = µl and yields the ﬁrst best
action level a
fb
l . The remaining ﬁrst order conditions are described by equations
(15), (16), and (17). Note that for p = 1=2 action levels coincide with the second
best and the wedge ∆wh reﬂects, due to risk neutrality, an inconsequential random-
ization. Hence, for p = 1=2 the equilibrium outcome coincides with the second best
and conﬁrms that at the optimum only constraints (8), (11), and (14) are binding.
When constraints (8), (11), and (14) are binding, type µl’s payoﬀ is
Ul(pjK) = (µh ¡ µl)(ah + ahh± + (ahl ¡ ahh)±p) + (2p ¡ 1)±(Sh(ahl) ¡ Sh(ahh))
+±(1 ¡ 2p)K:
This is identical to expression (20) except for the last term, which is decreasing in
p. Hence, by the argument used in the proof of Proposition 3, it may be established
that type µl’s overall payoﬀ is decreasing in p. To show that ˆ p(K) · ˆ p note ﬁrst
that ˆ p(0) = ˆ p and that Ul(pjK) < Ul(pj0) = Ul(p) for any K > 0 and p > 1=2.
Since ˆ p(K) satisﬁes Ul(ˆ p(K)jK) = 0 it follows Ul(ˆ p(K)jK) = 0 < Ul(ˆ pjK) and
hence ˆ p(K) < ˆ p for any K > 0. Q.E.D.
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